Online Appendix

Diplomatic Statements and the Strategic Use of Terrorism in Civil Wars Gabriella Levy Rebecca Dudley Chong Chen David A Siegel Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2023

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	Fixed-effect models			Mixed-effect models				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Pro-Rebel Resolution	-0.063***	-0.060***	-0.062***	-0.060***	-0.062***	-0.059***	-0.060***	-0.055^{***}
Dro Covernment Perclution	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
F10-Government Resolution	(0.047)	-0.002 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.047)	-0.002 (0.047)	(0.047)	-0.003 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.047)	(0.047)
Previous Pro Reb Res,Count	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001*	0.001**	0.001*	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Previous Pro Gov Res,Count	0.031***	0.024***	0.026***	0.023***	0.033***	0.026***	0.028***	0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Any Pro-Rebei Support	(0.030°)				(0.030^{-1})			
Any Pro-Government Support	-0.060^{***}				-0.067^{***}			
5	(0.015)				(0.015)			
Pro Reb Intervention, Troops		-0.100^{**}				-0.125^{***}		
		(0.043)				(0.042)		
Pro Gov Intervention, Iroops		(0.035)				(0.035)		
Pro Reb Intervention, Weapons		(0.022)	0.057***			(0.021)	0.063***	
, 1			(0.017)				(0.016)	
Pro Gov Intervention, Weapons			-0.000				-0.017	
			(0.017)	0.045***			(0.016)	0.001***
Pro Red Intervention, Economic				-0.045				$-0.061^{-0.0}$
Pro Gov Intervention, Economic				0.062***				0.063***
				(0.022)				(0.021)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.015^{***}	-0.015^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.015^{***}	-0.017^{***}	-0.019^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Logged GDP per capita	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.044^{***})	(0.047^{***})	(0.044^{***})	(0.045^{****})
Logged Population	(0.050) 0.316^{***}	(0.031) 0.309^{***}	(0.030) 0.298^{***}	(0.031) 0.302^{***}	(0.015) 0.095^{***}	0.096***	0.096***	(0.013) 0.093^{***}
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Rebel Strength	0.040***	0.038***	0.038***	0.033***	0.038***	0.036***	0.038***	0.021^{*}
0.11.11	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Cold War	(0.097)	(0.090)	0.075	(0.081)	-0.010	-0.012	-0.017	
Count of Rebel Groups	0.029***	0.030***	(0.000) 0.032^{***}	0.030***	(0.042) 0.027^{***}	(0.042) 0.028^{***}	(0.042) 0.031^{***}	
count of Rober Groups	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
Conflict Duration	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	
T	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	1 10 1***
Intercept	-5.096^{***} (1.336)	-5.004^{***}	-4.716^{***} (1.378)	-4.796^{***} (1.346)	-1.467^{***}	-1.514^{***}	-1.505^{***}	-1.434^{***}
	(1.550) VEC	(1.540) VEC	(1.576) VEC	(1.540) VEC	(0.233) VEC	(0.302) VEC	(0.500) VEC	(0.232)
Vear Fixed/Mixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
R^2	0.310	0.309	0.309	0.309	1 1.5	1 110	1 115	1 110
$\operatorname{Adj.} \mathbb{R}^2$	0.303	0.303	0.303	0.303				
Num. obs.	10222	10222	10222	10222	10222	10222	10222	10222
AIC					7526.508	7534.199	7530.634	7511.587
BIC Log Likelihood					7649.457 	7657.148 - 3750.000	7653.583	7612.839
Num. groups: country					-5740.204 56	-3730.099 56	-3740.317 56	-0741.794 56
Num. groups: year					29	29	29	29
Var: country (Intercept)					0.025	0.025	0.026	0.024
Var: year (Intercept)					0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011
Var: Residual					0.118	0.118	0.118	0.118

Table A1. Robustness Check: Alternative Regression Models for Attacks againstCivilians in Civil Wars

 $^{***}p < 0.01; \ ^{**}p < 0.05; \ ^*p < 0.1$

Figure A1. Robustness Check: Narrower Definition of Military Targets (Only Military, Police)



Note: Figure A1 displays the coefficients from linear models when using a narrower definition of military targets. Model specification are the same with Table 1 except the DV is using a narrower definition.

Figure A2. Robustness Check: Proportion of Fatalities from Civilian Attacks as DV



Note: Figure A2 displays the coefficients from linear models when using the Proportion of Fatalities from Civilian Attacks as DV.

Figure A3. Robustness Check: Number of Attacks Against Military vs Civilian Targets as DVs



(b) Civilian Targets

Note: Figure A3 displays the rescaled coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from linear models with lagged DVs.

Figure A4. Robustness Check: Using Group-Level Measure of DV from Polo and González (2020)



Note: Figure A4 displays the rescaled coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals based on alternative dependent variables from Polo and González (2020). The dependent variable in the leftmost part is the number of terrorist attacks. In the middle part, the dependent variable is the number of victims of terrorist attacks. In the rightmost part, it is the number of victims of terrorist attacks on soft civilian targets, i.e. only private citizens. This measure excludes official targets and infrastructure attacks. The data in these models covers only 1989-2009. All other covariates are omitted due to space constraints.

Figure A5. Robustness Check: Using One-sided Violence from UCDP GED



Note: Figure A5 displays the rescaled coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals based on alternative dependent variables from the UCDP georeferenced event dataset (UCDP GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013). The dependent variable is the number of one-sided violence events. The data in these models covers only 1989-2009. All other covariates, which are identical to those used in the main models, are omitted due to space constraints.

	Ge	eneral Assem	bly Resolutio	ons	Security Council Resolutions				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	
Pro-Rebel Resolution	-0.043	-0.041	-0.042	-0.041	-0.104^{***}	-0.096^{***}	-0.102^{***}	-0.098^{***}	
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	
Pro-Government Resolution	-0.002	0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.051	0.048	0.045	0.044	
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	
Previous Pro Reb Res Count	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000***	0.000*	0.000*	
rievious rie res, count	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	
Provious Pro Cov Ros Count	0.001***	0.000***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	0.000***	
Trevious 110 Gov rics, Count	(0.001)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.001)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.000)	
Arres Data Data al Comercent	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Any Pro-Rebei Support	(0.014)				(0.042^{-10})				
	(0.015)				(0.015)				
Any Pro-Government Support	-0.025^{*}				-0.073***				
	(0.014)				(0.015)				
Pro Reb Intervention, Troops		-0.127^{***}				-0.069			
		(0.042)				(0.042)			
Pro Gov Intervention, Troops		0.094^{***}				0.014			
		(0.019)				(0.021)			
Pro Reb Intervention, Weapons			0.051^{***}				0.078^{***}		
			(0.016)				(0.016)		
Pro Gov Intervention, Weapons			0.029^{*}				-0.031^{*}		
, I			(0.016)				(0.016)		
Pro Reb Intervention Economic			(0.010)	-0.061***			(01020)	-0.042^{**}	
				(0.016)				(0.016)	
Pro Cov Intervention Economic				0.120***				0.032	
1 10 Gov intervention, Leononne				(0.120)				(0.052)	
Physical Integrity Dights	0.012***	0.014***	0.015***	0.015***	0.015***	0.018***	0.016***	0.016***	
i nysicai integrity rugitts	-0.013	-0.014	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	-0.018	-0.010	-0.010	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Logged GDP per capita	0.051	0.050	0.047	0.049	0.037	0.039	0.039	0.038	
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	
Logged Population	0.094***	0.094***	0.096***	0.089***	0.085***	0.086***	0.085***	0.087***	
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	
Rebel Strength	0.032^{***}	0.028^{**}	0.025^{**}	0.020	0.018	0.009	0.022^{*}	0.017	
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	
Cold War	-0.032	-0.027	-0.038	-0.023	-0.012	-0.014	-0.017	-0.015	
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	
Count of Rebel Groups	0.039^{***}	0.036^{***}	0.039^{***}	0.036^{***}	0.025^{***}		0.029^{***}	0.026^{***}	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)	
Conflict Duration	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	
Intercept	-1.524^{***}	-1.533***	-1.546^{***}	-1.447^{***}	-1.272***	-1.283^{***}	-1.290^{***}	-1.316***	
	(0.295)	(0.299)	(0.303)	(0.291)	(0.309)	(0.310)	(0.314)	(0.308)	
Mixed Country Effects	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	
Mixed Vear Effects	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	VES	
AIC	7657 604	7622 110	7642.288	7615 464	7510.277	7528 146	7520.072	7525 729	
DIC	7780.620	7052.110	7042.200	7015.404	7649 402	7626.608	7642.007	7659 752	
	2011 000	2700.055	2004 144	2700 720	2742.405	1050.098	1045.097	1006.105	
Log Likelinood	-3811.802	-3799.055	-3804.144	-3790.732	-3/42.689	-3749.073	-3743.036	-3/50.864	
Num. obs.	10268	10268	10268	10268	10268	10268	10268	10268	
Num. groups: country	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	56	
Num. groups: year	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	
Var: country (Intercept)	0.024	0.025	0.026	0.024	0.027	0.028	0.029	0.027	
Var: year (Intercept)	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.011	
Var: Residual	0.119	0.118	0.118	0.118	0.117	0.117	0.117	0.117	

Table A2. Robustness Check: The Impacts of General Assembly vs. Security Council Resolutions on Attacks against Civilians in Civil Wars

 $^{***}p < 0.01; \ ^{**}p < 0.05; \ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure A6. Robustness Check: Control for Other Forms of Interventions





Note: Figure A6 displays the coefficients from linear models (panel a) and mixed-effects models (pabel b) when considering other forms of intervention. Other forms of intervention are considered according to the UCDP External Support data. Here we present results for intervention in the form of access to military or intelligence material or joint operations, material or logistics support, training or expertise, and intelligence material.



Figure A7. Robustness Check: Excluding Outliers

Note: Excluding Israel, Afghanistan and South Africa (mixed-effects models)

Note: Figure A7 displays the coefficients from mixed-effects models. This set of models omits the three countries with the highest number of resolutions from the United Nations, to ensure that the results are not driven by the countries who receive the most attention from the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council. The top three countries, omitted here as outliers, are Israel with 171 resolutions, Afghanistan with 68 resolutions, and South Africa with 64 resolutions. The country with the next-most number of resolutions is Sudan, with 24.

Figure A8. Robustness Check: Including Count of Previous Interventions As Control Variables



Note: Figure A8 displays the coefficients from mixed-effects models that use previous pro-rebel and pro-government interventions

(troops, weapons, and economics) as new covariates.

Table A3. Robustness Check: Linear Regression Results for Attacks against Civilians in Civil Wars (Conditional on Regime Types of External State Supporters)

	Unconditional models			Interaction models				
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Lagged DV (Prop Attacks Against Civilians)	0.474***	0.474***	0.474***	0.469***	0.473***	0.474***	0.474***	0.468***
Pro-Rebel Resolution	(0.009) -0.058^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.055^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.058^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.057^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.058^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.054^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.057^{***} (0.020)	(0.009) -0.057^{***} (0.020)
Pro-Government Resolution	-0.036 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.037 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.040 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.041 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.037 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.037 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.040 (0.045)	(0.020) -0.043 (0.045)
Any Pro-Rebel Support	-0.023^{*} (0.013)	(0.0 -0)	(0.00-00)	(0.0 -0)	(0.010) (0.022) (0.019)	(0.000)	(0.0 -0)	(010-00)
Any Pro-Government Support	-0.020 (0.013)				-0.064^{**} (0.026)			
Pro Reb Intervention, Troops	· /	-0.111^{***} (0.034)			· /	-0.114 (0.240)		
Pro Gov Intervention, Troops		0.032^{*} (0.019)				-0.029 (0.034)		
Pro Reb Intervention, Weapons		()	0.000 (0.013)			. ,	-0.050^{*} (0.029)	
Pro Gov Intervention, Weapons			-0.042^{***} (0.014)				-0.122^{***} (0.040)	
Pro Reb Intervention, Economic				-0.093^{***} (0.013)				-0.038^{*} (0.023)
Pro Gov Intervention, Economic				0.026^{*} (0.015)				0.022 (0.045)
Regime types of Pro Gov supporters	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Regime types of Pro Reb supporters	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)
Any Pro-Rebel Support \times Regime types of Pro Reb supporters					0.004 (0.018)			
Any Pro-Government Support \times Regime types of Pro Gov supporters					0.036^{*} (0.019)			
Pro Reb Intervention, Troops \times Regime types of Pro Reb supporters					. ,	0.017 (0.241)		
Pro Gov Intervention, Troops \times Regime types of Pro Gov supporters						0.058^{**} (0.027)		
Pro Reb Intervention, Weapons \times Regime types of Pro Reb supporters						. ,	0.064^{**} (0.028)	
Pro Gov Intervention, Weapons \times Regime types of Pro Gov supporters							0.059^{**} (0.029)	
Pro Reb Intervention, Economic \times Regime types of Pro Reb supporters							()	-0.070^{***} (0.024)
Pro Gov Intervention, Economic \times Regime types of Pro Gov supporters								-0.000 (0.033)
Previous Pro Reb Res,Count	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	(0.001^{***})
Previous Pro Gov Res,Count	(0.000) (0.010^{***}) (0.002)	0.006^{**} (0.003)	(0.000) (0.009^{***}) (0.002)	$(0.008)^{(0.000)}$ $(0.008)^{(0.002)}$	(0.000) 0.008^{***} (0.002)	(0.002) (0.003)	$(0.008)^{(0.000)}$ (0.008^{***})	(0.008^{***}) (0.002)
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.012^{***} (0.002)	-0.012^{***}	-0.012^{***}	-0.013^{***}	-0.012^{***}	-0.013^{***}	-0.012^{***}	-0.013^{***}
Logged GDP per capita	(0.002) 0.042^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.046^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.044^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.043^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.042^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.047^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.043^{***} (0.003)	(0.002) 0.043^{***} (0.003)
Logged Population	(0.003) 0.033^{***} (0.002)	(0.003) 0.034^{***} (0.002)	(0.003) 0.034^{***}	(0.003) (0.033^{***})	(0.003) (0.033^{***})	(0.003) (0.033^{***})	(0.003) 0.034^{***}	(0.003) 0.033^{***}
Rebel Strength	(0.003) 0.035^{***}	(0.003) 0.031^{***}	0.036***	0.032***	(0.003) 0.037^{***}	(0.003) 0.032^{***}	(0.003) 0.037^{***}	(0.003) 0.032^{***}
Cold War	(0.008) -0.015^{**}	(0.008) -0.017^{**}	(0.008) -0.012	(0.008) -0.013^{*}	(0.008) -0.014^{*}	(0.008) -0.018^{**}	(0.008) -0.011	(0.008) -0.012
Count of Rebel Groups	(0.007) 0.020^{***}	(0.007) 0.019^{***}	(0.008) 0.021^{***}	(0.007) 0.017^{***}	(0.007) 0.020^{***}	(0.007) 0.018^{***}	(0.008) 0.020^{***}	(0.007) 0.018^{***}
Conflict Duration	(0.005) 0.000^{*}	(0.005) 0.000^{*}	(0.005) 0.000^{*}	(0.005) 0.000^{***}	(0.005) 0.000^{*}	(0.005) 0.000^{**}	(0.005) 0.000^{**}	(0.005) 0.000^{***}
Intercept	(0.000) -0.590^{***} (0.058)	(0.000) -0.634^{***} (0.057)	(0.000) -0.629^{***} (0.057)	(0.000) -0.589^{***} (0.057)	(0.000) -0.580^{***}	(0.000) -0.618^{***} (0.057)	(0.000) -0.617^{***} (0.057)	(0.000) -0.600^{***} (0.057)
P2	(0.008)	(0.007)	0.222	0.225	(0.008)	(0.007)	0.222	0.225
Adj. R ²	0.332 0.331 10222	0.332 0.331 10222	0.332 0.331 10222	0.335 0.334 10222	0.333 0.332 10222	0.333 0.331 10222	0.333 0.332 10222	0.335 0.334 10222
	10222	10444	10444	10222	10444	10444	10222	10222

 $^{***}p < 0.01; \ ^{**}p < 0.05; \ ^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure A9. Robustness Check: The Conditional Effects of Material Inventions on Regime Types of External Supporters



Note: Figure A9 displays the marginal effects of Material Inventions conditional on Regime Types of External Supporters based on models 5-8 in Table A3.



Figure A10. Robustness Check: Use Different Lags for Key Independent Variables

Note: Figure A10 displays the rescaled coefficients with 95% confidence intervals from linear model with lagged DVs. All other covarites are omitted due to space constrains. Model specifications for control variables are the same with the ones in Table1.

	Troops In	tervention	Weapons I	ntervention	Economic Intervention		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	
Lagged DV (Prop Attacks Against Civilians)	0.455^{***}	0.455^{***}	0.454^{***}	0.454^{***}	0.455^{***}	0.455^{***}	
Pro-Rebel Resolution	(0.010) -0.059 (0.060)	(0.010)	(0.010) -0.062 (0.060)	(0.010)	(0.010) -0.061 (0.060)	(0.010)	
Pro-Government Resolution	0.068 (0.083)		0.063 (0.083)		0.068 (0.083)		
Previous Pro Reb Res,Count	-0.034^{***} (0.013)	-0.035^{***}	-0.039^{***} (0.013)	-0.039^{***} (0.013)	-0.033^{**} (0.013)	-0.034^{**} (0.013)	
Previous Pro Gov Res,Count	(0.010) (0.002) (0.006)	(0.013) (0.003) (0.006)	(0.010) (0.000) (0.005)	(0.010) (0.000) (0.005)	(0.009^{*}) (0.005)	(0.009^{*}) (0.005)	
Pro Reb Intervention, Troops	-0.096^{**} (0.038)	-0.096^{**} (0.038)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Pro Gov Intervention, Troops	(0.069^{***}) (0.021)	(0.069^{***}) (0.021)					
Pro Reb Intervention, Weapons	(0.022)	(0.022)	0.069^{***}	0.069^{***}			
Pro Gov Intervention, Weapons			-0.055^{***} (0.017)	-0.055^{***} (0.017)			
Pro Reb Intervention, Economic			(0.011)	(0.011)	-0.055^{***}	-0.055^{***}	
Pro Gov Intervention, Economic					(0.010) 0.046^{***} (0.017)	(0.010) 0.046^{***} (0.017)	
Physical Integrity Rights	-0.018^{***}	-0.018^{***}	-0.019^{***}	-0.019^{***}	(0.017) -0.019^{***} (0.002)	(0.017) -0.019^{***} (0.002)	
Logged GDP per capita	(0.002) 0.053^{***} (0.004)	(0.002) 0.053^{***} (0.004)	(0.002) 0.052^{***} (0.004)	(0.002) 0.052^{***} (0.004)	(0.002) 0.051^{***} (0.004)	(0.002) 0.051^{***} (0.004)	
Logged Population	(0.004) 0.040^{***} (0.003)	(0.004) (0.040^{***}) (0.003)	(0.004) 0.041^{***} (0.003)	(0.004) 0.042^{***} (0.003)	(0.004) 0.039^{***} (0.003)	(0.004) 0.039^{***} (0.003)	
Rebel Strength	(0.000) (0.029^{***}) (0.009)	(0.000) (0.030^{***}) (0.009)	(0.000) 0.036^{***} (0.009)	(0.000) 0.037^{***} (0.009)	(0.000) 0.027^{***} (0.009)	(0.000) 0.027^{***} (0.009)	
Cold War	-0.031^{***}	-0.032^{***}	-0.027^{***}	-0.028^{***}	-0.026^{***}	-0.026^{***}	
Count of Rebel Groups	(0.000) 0.032^{***} (0.006)	0.033***	(0.000) 0.032^{***} (0.006)	(0.000) 0.032^{***} (0.006)	0.028***	0.028***	
Conflict Duration	(0.000) (0.000)	(0.000) (0.000)	(0.000) (0.000)	(0.000) (0.000)	(0.000) (0.000)	(0.000) (0.000)	
Intercept	(0.000) -0.796^{***} (0.062)	(0.000) -0.798^{***} (0.062)	(0.000) -0.800^{***} (0.063)	(0.000) -0.803^{***} (0.062)	(0.000) -0.757^{***} (0.063)	(0.000) -0.760^{***} (0.063)	
R ²	0.340	0.340	0.341	0.340	0.340	0.340	
Adj. R ²	0.339	0.339	0.339	0.339	0.339	0.339	
Num. obs.	7972	7972	7972	7972	7972	7972	

Table A4. Robustness Check: Linear Regression Results for Attacks against Civilians in Civil Wars (Excluding conflicts after the first resolution)

 $^{***}p < 0.01; \ ^{**}p < 0.05; \ ^{*}p < 0.1$

	Any Material Support	Disaggreg	Disaggregated Material Support			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model		
Lagged DV (Prop Attacks Against Civilians)	0.456***	0.465***	0.458***	0.459***		
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)		
Pro-Rebel Resolution	-0.036^{*}	-0.036^{*}	-0.035^{*}	-0.035		
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)		
Pro-Government Resolution	-0.209**	-0.227**	-0.213**	-0.223^{*}		
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)		
Previous Pro Reb Res,Count	0.001**	0.001**	0.001**	0.001*		
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)		
Previous Pro Gov Res, Count	0.016*	0.014	0.015	0.008		
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)		
Any Pro-Rebel Support	-0.169^{***}					
An Dry Commune Commune	(0.044)					
Any Pro-Government Support	0.097^{*}					
Dro Dah Internetion Theory	(0.052)	0.075				
Fro Keo Intervention, Iroops		-0.075				
Des Co. Later entire Transm		(0.101)				
Pro Gov Intervention, Troops		-0.149				
Dro Bob Intermention Weeneng		(0.100)	0 190***			
Pro Red Intervention, weapons			$-0.120^{-0.120}$			
Dre Con Internetion Weeners			(0.037)			
Pro Gov Intervention, weapons			-0.008			
Dro Dah Intermention Fromensia			(0.054)	0 110*		
Pro Red Intervention, Economic				-0.110°		
Dra Con Intermention From and				0.000*		
Fro Gov Intervention, Economic				(0.202)		
Dhanical Internity Dights	0.015**	0.010	0.01.4*	0.019		
Physical Integrity Rights	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.014)	0.012		
Lannad CDD non conita	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	0.057**		
Logged GDP per capita	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.055)	0.007		
Lograd Dopulation	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	0.002		
Logged Fopulation	0.000	(0,000)	(0.004)	(0.003		
Pohol Strongth	(0.010) 0.114***	(0.009) 0.110***	(0.010) 0.107***	0.107**		
Reper Strength	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.107)	(0.001)		
Cold War	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)			
COIU WAI	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.014	-0.020	-0.020		
Count of Rebel Croups	(0.017) 0.007	0.010)	(0.010)	0.017		
Count of Reper Groups	(0,000)	(0.001)	(0,000)	0.000		
Conflict Duration	0.009)	0.009)	0.009)	0.009		
		(0,000)	(0,000)	(0.000		
Intercent	(0.000) -0.140	-0.183	-0.140	_0.149		
mercept	(0.170)	(0.178)	(0.178)	-0.14		
	(0.173)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)		
\mathbb{R}^2	0.359	0.356	0.358	0.358		
Adj. R ²	0.355	0.352	0.354	0.354		
Num. obs.	2392	2392	2392	2392		

Table A5. Robustness Check: Linear Regression Results for Attacks against Civilians in Civil Wars (Matched Sample)

***p < 0.01;**p < 0.05;*p < 0.1



Figure A11. Visualization of the Correlation among DVs

Note: Figure A11 displays the correlation coefficients among key DVs for the period from 1989-2009.

B. Formal Appendix

We use backward induction to find the equilibrium behavior at each decision point in the game.

Third Decision

In the last step, R must decide on v_{c2} . R's utility is given by equation (1) in the text, with the constraints that $v_{m2} = 1 - v_{c2}$ and both are in the range [0, 1]. We can immediately plug the first of these constraints into equation (1), then construct the constrained optimization problem only with respect to v_{c2} . That results in the equality $-v_{c2} + \frac{m}{1+p}(1-v_{c2}) + \mu_1 - \mu_2 = 0$, with both $\mu_i \ge 0$. The interior solution sets both $\mu_i = 0$ and yields the partial equilibrium level of violence against civilians in the second period, $v_{c2}^* = \frac{m}{1+m+p}$. The corner case $v_{c2} = 0$ requires $\frac{m}{1+p} + \mu_1 = 0$ which is a contradiction and so cannot hold. The corner case $v_{c2} = 1$ requires $-1 - \mu_2 = 0$ which is again a contradiction. Thus, only the interior solution is available.

By inspection, we can see the interior solution decreases in the level of support given, which leads to the first statement in the text.

Second Decision

In the preceding step, P must decide on a level of p. P's utility is given by equation (2) in the text, with the constraint that $p \ge 0$, and using $v_{c2}^* = \frac{m}{1+m+p}$ and $v_{m1} = 1 - v_{c1}$. Constructing the constrained optimization problem with respect to p, we get the equality $\frac{m}{(1+p+m)^2} - p(r+v_{c1}) + \mu_3 = 0$ with $\mu_3 \ge 0$ for the S leg of the game, and the same only with $\frac{m}{1+m}$ instead of v_{c1} for the $\sim S$

leg of the game. Checking the corner case of p = 0 first, we see that yields a contradiction: $\frac{m}{(1+m)^2} + \mu_3 = 0$, which cannot be true. Thus, only the interior solution holds. Rearranging and then solving the resulting cubic equation for its unique solution in real numbers, for r > 0, yields

$$0 = p^* (1 + p^* + m)^2 - \frac{m}{r+A},$$

$$p^* = \frac{1}{6} [-4(1+m) + 2^{4/3}(1+m)^2 Z^{-1/3} + 2^{2/3} Z^{1/3}], \text{ with}$$

$$Z = 2(1+m)^3 + \frac{27m}{r+A} + \left(\left(4(1+m)^3 + \frac{27m}{r+A} \right) \left(\frac{27m}{r+A} \right) \right)^{1/2}, \text{ where}$$

$$A = \begin{cases} v_{c1} \text{ if } S, \\ \frac{m}{1+m} \text{ if } \sim S. \end{cases}$$

Implicit differentiation allows us to compute the rate of change of the equilibrium level of material support, p^* , with the previous period's allocation to civilian violence, v_{c1} . This is

$$\frac{dp^*}{dv_{c1}} = \frac{-m}{(r+v_{c1})^2(1+p+m)(1+3p+m)},\tag{3}$$

which is negative. That leads to the second statement in the text.

First Decision

In the first step, R must decide on v_{c1} . R's utility is given by equation (1) in the text, with the constraints that $v_{m1} = 1 - v_{c1}$ and both are in the range [0, 1], and with p^* and v_{c2}^* inserted. After $\sim S$, p^* is independent of v_{c1} , and R's decision is the same as it is in the last step of the game, to allocate the baseline level to attacks on civilians: $v_{c1}^*(\sim S) = \frac{m}{1+m}$. That level is increasing in m but unaffected by r.

When a statement has been made, p^* depends on v_{c1} . Equation (1) becomes

$$U_R = -\frac{(m+1)}{2}v_{c1}^2 + mv_{c1} - \frac{m}{2}\left(1 + \frac{1}{1+p+m}\right).$$

Making use of equation (3) allows us to construct the constrained maximization problem with respect to v_{c1} . That is

$$-(m+1)v_{c1} + m - \frac{m^2}{2(1+p+m)^3(1+3p+m)(r+v_{c1})^2} + \mu_4 - \mu_5 = 0,$$
(4)

with $\mu_4, \mu_5 \ge 0$.

One corner case of equation (4) is not possible. If $v_{c1} = 1$, then (4) becomes

$$-1 - \frac{m^2}{2(1+p+m)^3(1+3p+m)(r+1)^2} - \mu_5 = 0,$$

which is a contradiction. The other corner case is possible, though, for small enough r, as it

requires

$$m - \frac{m^2}{2(1+p+m)^3(1+3p+m)r^2} + \mu_4 = 0,$$

or that

$$m \ge 2(1+p+m)^3(1+3p+m)r^2.$$

While (4) provides an implicit solution to the optimization problem, an explicit one is more difficult to obtain. Therefore, we numerically find the optimum for a wide range of r and m parameter values. Figure B1 plots these equilibrium values.

Figure B1. Equilibrium values of civilian violence allocation after public statement



As Figure B1 indicates, as we would expect, increasing m increases the marginal cost of military violence and so increases the allocation of civilian violence in equilibrium. Making it more costly for the third party to provide material support, by increasing r, has the same effect, since it also effectively increases R's marginal cost of military violence post third-party material support. We also note that, as indicated in our analysis of equation (4), it is possible, for very small values of r and sufficiently small values of m, to have an equilibrium allocation of no civilian violence. A similar figure (not shown) holds for the dependence of v_{c2}^* on its parameters, once v_{c1}^* and p^* have been inserted. These conclusions lead to statement four in the text.

We can compare the values in Figure B1, obtained under the public statement to the baseline ones obtained in the absence of the statement. We show this difference in Figure B2.





Though small given most of the parameter values we explored, the difference is always positive, indicating that making the public signal does reduce v_{c1} , despite its having no immediate effect on R's marginal cost of military violence production. That leads to statement three in the text. The difference gets larger for smaller values of r, a fact we've incorporated into statement four.