

Do Birds of a Feather Flock Together? Rebel Constituencies and Civil War Alliances

Supplementary Materials

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
A. Additional Figures and Tables

Note: Figures for logistic and multinomial logistic models below do not report the coefficients for cubic polynomial approximation terms on year (t , t^2 and t^3).


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Figure A1. Robustness Check: Logistic and Multinomial Regression Results with Interaction Effects between Co-Constituency Variables and Government Power (1946-2015)




(a) Logit coefficient plots (DV=Alliance)



(b) Multinomial logit coefficient plots


Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). Models 1 and 2 interact the shared constituency dummy variables with the number of government military personnel and GDP per capita, respectively. These results indicate that co-ethnic rebel organizations may be more inclined to cooperate in the face of stronger incumbents, casting doubt on the thesis that the observed lower levels of cooperation among them reflect government efforts at suppressing cooperation (as more powerful governments should be more effective at suppressing alliances).

Figure A2. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results for Alliance Controlling for Rebel Strength of Central Command (1946-2013)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). Our dyadic measure of rebel strength of central command is based on [Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan \(2013\)](#)'s organization-level measure, ranging from "low" to "medium" and "high." STRENGTH CENTRAL COMMAND ranges from 1 to 5 (low-low=1; low-medium and medium-low=2; medium-medium, low-high, and high-low=3; medium-high and high-medium=4; high-high=5).

Figure A3. Robustness Check: Multinomial Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Controlling for Rebel Strength of Central Command (1946-2013)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). Our dyadic measure of rebel strength of central command is based on [Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan \(2013\)](#)'s organization-level measure, ranging from "low" to "medium" and "high." STRENGTH CENTRAL COMMAND ranges from 1 to 5 (low-low=1; low-medium and medium-low=2; medium-medium, low-high, and high-low=3; medium-high and high-medium=4; high-high=5).

Figure A4. Robustness Check: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Rebel Strength of Central Command (1946-2013)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). The dependent variable is the ordinal measure of individual rebel organization’s strength of central command from the [Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan \(2013\)](#)’s dataset, ranging from “low” to “medium” and “high.” The results indicate that ethnic rebel organizations are particularly likely to develop strong central command systems.

Figure A5. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results for Alliance Onset (1946-2015)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). The analysis uses the same model specification as in Figure 3, but all observations of ongoing alliances are dropped, thus restricting the focus to alliance onset.

Figure A6. Robustness Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Onset (1946-2015)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). The analysis uses the same model specification as Figure 4, but all observations of ongoing alliances are dropped, thus restricting the focus to alliance onset.

Figure A7. Robustness Check: Split-Population Duration Model Results for Alliance (1946-2015)




Note: Estimated SPDM coefficients for ALLIANCE with 95% confidence intervals using log-logistic distribution.

Figure A8. Robustness Check: Split-Population Duration Model Results for Formal Alliance (1946-2015)




Note: Estimated SPDM coefficients for FORMAL ALLIANCE with 95% confidence intervals using log-logistic distribution.

Figure A9. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results for Alliance Controlling for State Co-Sponsor (1975-2009)




(a) With state co-sponsor




(b) Without state co-sponsor

Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). The figure reports models with and without controlling for common state co-sponsor for the same period (1979-2009). Though both CO-IDEOLOGICAL and CO-ETHNIC have a positive significant effect in panel a, a two-sample t-test over 1,000 simulations reveals significantly different marginal effects.

Figure A10. Robustness Check: Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Controlling for State Co-Sponsor (1975-2009)




(a) with state co-sponsor



(b) without state co-sponsor


Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). The figure reports models with and without controlling for common state co-sponsor for the same period (1979-2009).

Figure A11. Robustness Check: AME Model Results Controlling for State Co-Sponsor (1975-2009)




Note: Estimated posterior means with 90% and 95% credible intervals.

Figure A12. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results for Alliance Controlling for Imbalance of Power (1946-2013)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level).

Figure A13. Robustness Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Controlling for Imbalance of Power (1946-2013)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level).

Figure A14. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results on Alliance Controlling for Mergers Variable (1946-2011)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). MERGER ORGANIZATIONS is a dummy variable indicating whether both members of a rebel dyad emerged as the result of mergers of different pre-existing organizations, based on FORGE data (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020).

Figure A15. Robustness Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Controlling for Mergers Variable (1946-2011)




Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). MERGER ORGANIZATIONS is a dummy variable indicating whether both members of a rebel dyad emerged as the result of mergers of different pre-existing organizations, based on FORGE data (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020).

Figure A16. Robustness Check: Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Breaking Down Shared Ideological Constituencies into Sub-Types (1946-2015)




(a) Logit coefficient plots (DV=Alliance)




(b) Multinomial logit coefficient plots

Note: Panel a and b display results from logit and multinomial logit models, respectively (coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals; standard errors clustered at the country level).

Figure A17. Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Results for Alliance Using an Alternative Shared Ideological Constituency Variable (1946-2015)




(a) Coefficients plots




(b) Marginal effects

Note: Panel a displays estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). Panel b presents the distributions of estimated first differences based on the posterior distribution of panel a’s parameters.

Figure A18. Robustness Check: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Formal and Informal Alliance Using an Alternative Shared Ideological Constituency Variable (1946-2015)




(a) Coefficients plots




(b) Marginal effects

Note: Panel a displays estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). Panel b presents the distributions of estimated first differences based on the posterior distribution of panel a’s parameters.

Figure A19. Robustness Check: Regressions Results Using FORGE Ideology Data (1946-2011)




(a) Logit coefficient plots (DV=Alliance)




(b) Multinomial logit coefficient plots

Note: Panel a and b display, respectively, estimated coefficients (with 90% and 95% confidence intervals; standard errors clustered at the country level) for logit and multinomial logit models. Each model includes a different combination of shared constituency variables: model 1, CO-IDEOLOGICAL (flagging dyads whose members share a left-wing ideology or a religiously-inspired ideology, based on FORGE data) and CO-ETHNIC; model 2, CO-IDEOLOGICAL, CO-ETHNIC, and CO-NATIONALIST (flagging dyads whose members share a nationalist outlook, based on FORGE data); model 3, CO-IDEOLOGICAL and CO-NATIONALIST; model 5, CO-LEFT-WING, CO-RELIGIOUS, CO-ETHNIC, and CO-NATIONALIST; model 6, CO-LEFT-WING, CO-RELIGIOUS, and CO-NATIONALIST.

Figure A20. Robustness Check: Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Using Proximate Ideology and Proxi-Distant Ideology (1946-2015)




(a) Logit coefficient plots (DV=Alliance) model



(b) Multinomial logit coefficient plots

Note: Estimated coefficients with 90% and 95% confidence intervals (standard errors clustered at the country level). PROXI-DISTANT flags rebel dyads whose members share a broad ideological constituency but do not belong to the same ideological sub-type (e.g., one is Marxist-Leninist, the other is Maoist); PROXIMATE marks dyads whose members belong to the same ideological sub-type (e.g., they are both transnational jihadists). We include these two dummies in the analysis, with dyads whose members do not belong to the same constituency as the baseline category.

Figure A21. Geographical Patterns for Within-Country Co-Constituencies (1946-2015)



Note: Gray areas in Figure A21 denote countries that did not experience multi-party civil wars and thus are not in our sample.

B. Coding Protocol for Rebel Alliances

In this section, we present the coding protocol we followed to code all rebel dyad-years in our dataset (with the help of several research assistants), using a range of sources, including scholarly and journalistic reports.¹

Procedure: We imputed information on a spreadsheet about whether a dyad-year had an alliance, and about its type (formal/informal). We also wrote a short report (in a separate word file) including consulted sources, specific information about cooperation/alliance, and an explanation of the coding rationale. We wrote a single report for each rebel dyad comprising all years in which the rebel pair existed. So, for example, we produced one report for the rebel dyad EPLF-ELF active in Ethiopia in the years 1972-1981, clearly identifying information about the existence or absence of an alliance for each of the years. We include two examples of our coding reports further below.

Types of alliances: Our coding distinguishes between *formal* and *informal* alliances, which are mutually exclusive categories:

- A *formal alliance* is publicly announced by the rebel groups and has a name. Often it will be referred to as an “umbrella” or “front” in the sources. If the groups are reported as having merged into a new organization, the latter would not be considered an alliance, but the evidence about the existence of a merge is included in a report on the rebel pair in question. Note that the existence of a written cooperation agreement between rebel groups does not necessarily amount to a formal alliance (as noted, a formal alliance is publicly announced and has a name), but may simply indicate an informal alliance (by which, for example, groups A and B commit to help one another with training or to share weapons). Evidence of actual, on-the-ground- cooperation (i.e., battlefield coordination or resources sharing) is

1. Our coding is not based on international media sources only; when possible, we have used local sources and we have also consulted books, articles, and reports written by local and regional experts. Several of the research assistants, as well as the authors, are fluent in different languages, and this has allowed us to access non-English sources of information. For a number of cases, we have discussed the coding with country experts, whose knowledge about inter-rebel dynamics extends beyond international media sources and relies on fieldwork. For the sake of anonymity, the names of the research assistants and the consulted experts will be listed in the published version of the manuscript.

not necessary for coding the existence of a formal alliance. Nonetheless coders were on the lookout for such evidence. In cases in which there is explicit evidence that a publicly announced, named alliance did not entail any cooperation whatsoever on the ground (what we call a “dead letter alliance”) we did not code the presence of a formal alliance.

- An *informal alliance* entails actual, on-the-ground cooperation between rebel groups in the absence of a formal alliance. There is cooperation if groups engage in battlefield coordination (i.e., joint battles or attacks, or coordinated attacks such that rebel group A engages the government when rebel group B is under government pressure to give respite to B) or resources sharing (e.g., rebel group A trains members of group B; the groups share weapons, intelligence or logistic networks to transport food, weapons and fighters). Cases in which rebel groups simply avoid one another (i.e., they have some sort of peaceful coexistence agreement or respect one another’s “spheres of influence”) do not represent informal alliances. Mere statements expressing sympathy or support for another group’s cause/struggle do not indicate the existence of an informal alliance either.

Sources: Our main sources were newspapers’ and academic books’ accounts on the relevant rebel groups. Yet, reports on rebel groups from think tanks and NGOs (e.g., the International Crisis Group) were also useful. Our coding procedure for informal alliances entailed taking into account claims put forth by the government or rebel groups, but weighing them less heavily than reports from credible independent sources like well-established newspapers or scholars. In fact, rebel group A may claim not to cooperate with rebel group B, but in reality they may have an informal alliance; similarly, the government may claim that rebel group A cooperates with rebel group B to discredit A by association with the unpopular B, even if no such cooperation has taken place. For cases in which we could not corroborate government or rebel claims about inter-rebel cooperation or absence thereof with independent sources, our coding procedure was to rely on the available sources and to note its limitation in the report.

Negative codings: Importantly, our coding procedure emphasized documenting negative codings

(i.e., cases in which we concluded that there is no alliance) by reporting consulted sources. When possible, negative codings would be supported by explicit evidence indicating the absence of cooperation between two rebel groups (for example, Sudan expert Eric Reeves talking about rebels in Darfur in 2009 noted: “Military coordination between the rebel factions is non-existent”).² In other cases, we simply report the absence of evidence suggesting the absence of an alliance. In these cases, our coding procedure entailed looking for evidence of cooperation in the years immediately preceding or following the year being coded, in search for indications about when a certain alliance started or ended.

Rebel infighting: If two groups are reported as having engaged in a major violent fight with one another, they are considered as neither formally nor informally allied. We include in the codebook any available information on the inter-rebel clash.

Pledging allegiance to the same organization: Our coding procedure entailed reporting information about instances in which two rebel groups formally declare allegiance to the same organization (for example, ISIS). We would code these instances as formal alliances, and, as noted for formal alliances in general, be on the lookout for the existence of informal cooperation too.

B.1. Example of coding #1) Case (Guatemala): EGP (Guerilla Army of the Poor) – FAR I (Rebel Armed Forces)

Coding

In 1981, there was *no alliance* between the two groups.

From 1982 to 1995, there was a *formal alliance* between the two groups (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG).

Background

The Guatemalan civil war began in 1960 and continued until its settlement through peace talks in 1996. The conflict was fought between a series of right-wing military governments and leftist

2. Reeves 2009.

armed organizations, relying upon the support of indigenous Mayan and Ladino communities as well as other groups. After failing to overthrow the government in a 1960 coup, the MR-13 group settled in the countryside where it would wage an insurgency throughout the 1960s. With the help of the United States, the Guatemalan government was able to suppress this and other insurgent groups. By the 1970s, a second wave of resistance emerged from the wreckage of the 1960s-era repression. The rebel groups included the EGP (Guerilla Army of the Poor), which by early 1982 claimed to have six active guerilla fronts; the FAR (Rebel Armed Forces); and the ORPA (Organization of the People in Arms). The FAR operated mainly in the country's central region, while ORPA established itself in several highland zones and in the west of the country.³ Eventually, in 1982 the three groups, together with a faction of the PGT (Guatemalan Party of Labor) known as the National Directing Nucleus (PGT-ND) formed the UNRG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity). The UNRG would continue to fight the government until the 1994-1996 peace process led to the conclusion of the war. The UNRG would later transform itself into a political party in the country's post-war democracy.

Evidence

1981: No alliance

We found no mention of actual, on-the-ground military cooperation, which would qualify for an informal alliance, nor evidence that the two alliances named in secondary sources were announced publicly either before or during the year 1981. The Guatemalan Truth Commission reports: "From 1977 to 1978, [the rebels] formed the La Tripartita (the Triad) involving three groups following a Marxist-Leninist orientation: the EGP, the FAR, and the PGT that followed Mario Sánchez known as the Núcleo de Dirección (PGT-ND). A bit later ORPA was invited to join el Cuatripartita (the Quartet)."⁴ However, we found no public reference to either la Tripartita or el Cuatripartita in newspaper sources on ProQuest or Lexis Nexis, suggesting that they were not publicly announced. In November 1980, the four groups, (EGP, FAR, PGT, and ORPA) formed an alliance under the

3. Deonandan and Close 2007, 45.

4. Rothenberg 2012, 126.

name “United Revolutionary Guatemalans.”⁵ However this does not appear to have been publicly announced, but rather was only publicly announced in February 1982 under the URNG name.⁶ The Truth Commission reports that “beginning in 1981, the FAR’s strategy was to activate its military forces in eastern Petén while using the west of the department as the rearguard.”⁷ In this discussion there is no mention of cooperation with the EGP.

1982–1995: Formal alliance

In February 1982, the EGP, ORPA, FAR I, and PGT-NDN agreed to create a formal alliance under the banner of the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity).⁸ The four groups maintained their own armed forces and each carried out military operations, which were jointly agreed upon by the leaders of the individual organizations through the Comandancia General.⁹

B.2. Example of coding #2) Myanmar: CPB (Communist Party of Burma) & KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) 1961-1988

Coding

From 1961 to 1975, there was *no alliance* between CPB and KIO.

From 1976 to 1988, there was an *informal alliance* between CPB and KIO.

Background

Since Burma’s independence in 1948, the country has been affected by armed conflict.¹⁰ In 1962, General Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party took power in a coup to establish a one-party military regime.¹¹ After protests against the government in the 1980s, the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won elections in a landslide, which led to years

5. [Historical Clarification Commission 2013](#), 237.

6. [Rothenberg 2012](#), 126.

7. [Rothenberg 2012](#), 129.

8. [Kruijt 2017](#), 42; [Dixon and Sarkees 2015](#), 119

9. [Deonandan and Close 2007](#), 195; [Dixon and Sarkees 2015](#), 119.

10. [Xu and Albert 2016](#).

11. BBC News, “Myanmar Timeline,” September 3, 2018, accessed December 3, 2018, available at < <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12992883>>.

of repression by the military government.¹² The military allowed partially free elections only in 2011.¹³

The CPB was founded in 1939, with the declared objective of socialist revolution to be achieved through armed struggle.¹⁴ The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Encyclopedia describes KIO as a “political organization founded in February 1961 with the aim of bringing independence to the multi-ethnic Christian and Buddhist Kachin people of northern Burma (now known as Myanmar). Its armed wing is known as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).”¹⁵

Evidence

1961-1975: No alliance

Much of the CPB and KIO history is plagued by violence between the two groups. Bertil Lintner writes that “fierce fighting raged between the CPB and the KIA until 1976 when a ceasefire eventually was reached between the two rebel armies.”¹⁶ Michael Fredholm also describes CPB-KIO fighting in the years before their alliance:

“In early 1968, the CPB forces also began to push into the territory controlled by the KIO. This was clearly a mistake, as the KIO fought back.”¹⁷... The late 1970s were characterized by numerous offensives and counter-offensives and a large number of casualties on all sides. It should be remembered that the fighting raged not only between the CPB and the Tatmadaw but also between these two forces and various other insurgent groups, such as the KIO and SSPP. The two latter groups eventually joined the CPB in an alliance, but the road to this alliance was frequently stained by blood.”¹⁸

Martin Smith adds to the evidence of intense hostility between CPB and KIO when he specifies that CPB’s difficulties in the 1970s were in part due to the KIO, which “resisted the CPB with

12. Ibid.

13. Xu and Albert 2016.

14. Fredholm 1993, 32.

15. “KIO,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, accessed December 5, 2018, available at < <http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/201>>.

16. Lintner 1990, 25.

17. Fredholm 1993, 216.

18. Fredholm 1993, 219.

equal fire.”¹⁹ Important to note in this time frame, however, is that in 1968, the CPB reached out to the KIO to form an alliance, which failed in a matter of four months:

“[O]n 15 January 1968, apparently unaware (KIO leaders say) of fighting with the CPB which had already broken out inside Burma, Zau Tu and Ba Thein Tin signed a joint agreement (written in both Burmese and Jinghpaw) to set up a military and political ‘united front’ to fight the ‘Ne Win revisionist government.’ The KIO received several hundred badly needed weapons. ... Within four months the agreement was in shreds after clashes between rival troops over territory in the Mong Ko area.”²⁰

The fighting between the organizations warrants a coding of no alliance in 1968, despite their short-lived agreement to cooperate. In sum, from 1961 to 1975, we code this dyad as *no alliance*.

1976-1988: Informal alliance

Smith notes that in early 1976, KIO and CPB leaders met for three months and signed a joint military agreement in July, stipulating that CPB troops could move freely through KIO territory to be able to fight further west in Burma.²¹ KIO obtained Chinese weapons from CPB.²² Although the two groups signed a “joint military agreement,” Smith does not mention a name for the alliance. Lintner’s list of Burmese rebel fronts also does not list any front with the CPB and the KIO in 1976.²³

Fredholm indicates that the groups continued to cooperate as far as 1988: “The fighting [of 1988] continued, as the CPB from now on stepped up operations, usually together with the KIO. On 13 December, a combined CPB and KIO force defeated and wiped out a column from the Tatmadaw’s 3rd infantry battalion, near Kongsá, twenty miles east of Kutkai.”²⁴ Since there is evidence of a military agreement between KIO and CPB during this time frame, yet without the creation of a named alliance, we code this dyad as an *informal alliance*.

19. Smith 1999, 248.

20. Smith 1999, 251-52.

21. Smith 1999, 331.

22. Smith 1999, 331.

23. Linter 1994, 436.

24. Fredholm 1993, 224.

C. Coding Protocol for Co-Ideology

C.1. Coding Protocol for Co-Marxism

We used information on Marxist ideology of rebel groups from [Balcells and Kalyvas 2015](#), who kindly shared their data with us. We code as Marxist the cases they have coded as Revolutionary Socialist (RS) or Marxist National Liberation (MNL) Movements. For the cases in our dataset not included in [Balcells and Kalyvas 2015](#)'s, we did the coding ourselves. We used [Balcells and Kalyvas 2015](#)'s coding protocol for consistency.

Following [Balcells and Kalyvas 2015](#), coding a rebel group as Marxist required answering affirmatively the following question: “Did the rebels have a professed Marxist ideology (e.g. did they produce manifestos or made declarations that had references to Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, or to a socialist revolution)?” The result is a binary variable with value 1 if the group is Marxist, and value 0 if the group is not Marxist. Among other sources of information, the coders consulted the Non-State Actor dataset and the corresponding “Case Descriptions” ([Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011](#)).

For the coding of the alternative measure of shared ideological constituency used in robustness checks, we classified all Marxist rebel organizations in our dataset in one of the following Marxist categories:

- Marxist-Leninist
- Maoist
- Trotskyist
- Generic Marxist/Socialist Revolutionary/Communist

The fourth, residual category corresponds to organizations reported as embracing an unspecified leftist social revolutionary ideology or as eclectically borrowing elements from multiple ideologies,

including one or more sub-type of Marxist ideology, without clearly falling into any of the other three.

For this coding, we conducted additional research, rather than relying on existing datasets, which tend to code revolutionary socialist or Marxist groups as a general category. Our coding is based on the classification of rebel organizations in secondary sources (ranging from conflict encyclopedias to newspapers, think tank reports, and scholarly works)²⁵ and, when information is available, on rebel leaders' own classification of their organization's ideology.²⁶ We also consulted several country experts, following [Wimmer 2012](#) and [Kalyvas and Balcells 2010](#).²⁷

Based on the above organization-level classification, we created an alternative dyad-level binary variable indicating co-Marxism, which is equal to 1 if both members of a dyad belong to the same Marxist sub-type (e.g., they are both transnational Maoist), and 0 otherwise.

C.2. Coding Protocol for Co-Islamism

Using various secondary sources, ranging from encyclopedias (in particular, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia and the Mapping Militants Project), newspapers, think tank reports, and scholarly works, we code as Islamist rebel organizations claiming to be fighting to advance political goals inspired by their interpretation of Islam, including (but not limited to) the establishment of a state or autonomous region ruled by Sharia law. Our conceptualization is broad, encompassing various, partially overlapping sub-types (see below). We code pairs of Islamist organizations as *co-Islamist* if their members are on the same side of the main Islamic sectarian divide (i.e., both organizations adhere to Sunni Islam or both adhere to Shia Islam).

For the coding of the alternative measure of shared ideological constituency used in robustness checks, we classified all Islamist rebel organizations in our dataset in one of the following Islamist categories, drawing on classification schemes put forth by [Gerges 2005](#) and [Hegghammer 2009a,b](#):

25. For example, Sendero Luminoso is discussed as Maoist by various scholars, such as [Ron 2001](#).

26. For example, the former TPLF leader Aregawi ([Berhe 2009](#)) labeled the TPLF as Marxist-Leninist.

27. We thank XXXXX for their help in this coding.

- One-country revolutionary jihadist, aiming at the establishment of political authority on the basis of a literalist interpretation of Islamic scriptures in a specific country (e.g., Algeria’s Groupe Islamique Armé, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Ahrar al-Sham)
- Transnational jihadist, whose revolutionary agenda has a regional or global scope (e.g., ISIS, AQ, AQAP)
- Islamic nationalist, whose goal is expulsion of alien occupiers or self-determination (e.g., Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Moro Islamic Liberation Front)
- Sectarian jihadist (e.g., Iraqi militias)
- Democratic/reformist Islamist, which “emphatically embrace democratic principles and elements of a modernist outlook” (Gerges 2005, 2) (e.g., rebel groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood).

Given that rebel organizations often straddle the line across Islamist sub-types (Hegghammer 2009a), we classify them in the category where they best fit based on the available information. For example, we code Lashkar-e-Islam in Pakistan as sectarian, because of its emphasis on targeting Sunni Barelvi and Shia groups,²⁸ even though its ideology also has revolutionary jihadi elements, given that its aims include strict application of Sharia law in Pakistan’s Khyber District.

Based on the above organization-level classification, we created an alternative dyad-level binary variable indicating co-Islamism, which is equal to 1 if both members of a dyad belong to the same Islamist sub-type (e.g., they are both transnational jihadist, as in the dyad Islamic State and Forces of the Caucasus Emirate in Russia), and 0 otherwise.

D. Coding Protocol for Co-Ethnicity

Following ACD2EPR (Vogt et al. 2015), we adopt a broad definition of ethnicity as a subjective sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and culture. Various markers of shared ancestry and culture may be relevant, including common language, race, and/or religion. We code

28. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/lashkar-e-islam#vertical_select_18151.

a rebel organization as affiliated with an ethnic group if the organization casts claims on behalf of that ethnic community; organizations can make claims on behalf of multiple ethnic groups and thus have multiple ethnic affiliations ([Wucherpfennig et al. 2012](#)). We code the existence of an ethnic claim if ACD2EPR reports either direct or indirect evidence of such a claim (e.g., an ethnic reference in the name of the group). Two organizations are coded as co-ethnic if they make claims for the same ethnic community.

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